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Trope bundle theories of substance (e.g. Williams 1953; Camp-
bell 1990; Maurin 2002; Keinänen 2011, Keinänen & 
Hakkarainen 2010, 2014; Giberman 2014) aim to construct ob-
jects and all other entities by means of aggregates of tropes. 
Tropes are thin particular natures like a particular –e charge or 
a particular roundness in some location. Thus, tropes are them-
selves concrete in the sense of having some specific spatial or 
spatio-temporal location. In trope theories, objects and all 
other particulars are constructed as mereological sums of 
tropes that fulfil certain conditions. For instance, objects are 
identified with mereological sums of mutually co-located 
(“concurrent” or “compresent”) tropes (cf. Williams 1953; 
Campbell 1990). The thin nature of a trope is contrasted with 
the thick nature of the object constituted by distinct tropes.1 
It has been customary to consider tropes as particularized 
qualities or particular properties of objects (cf. Armstrong 1989, Al-
len 2016). The standard ways to pick out and identify tropes as 
properties of objects (like the redness of some rose) have pro-
vided support to this intuitive conception.2 Nevertheless, be-
ing a particular property is a primitive category feature of 
1 In Williams’ and Campbell’s classical trope theories, tropes are also con-
sidered as “abstract” in the sense of having capability of being co-located 
with other tropes, Fisher (2018, sec.1). 
2 As does Lowe (2003), we have distinguished between individuation in the 
epistemic sense (i.e., picking out an entity in our thought) and individua-
tion in the metaphysical sense. (i.e., the determination of the identity con-
ditions of an entity). Moreover, we defend the idea that tropes have 
primitive identity conditions, Keinänen & Hakkarainen (2014). 
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modes, which primitively inhere in (or, characterize) objects.3 
By contrast, most trope theories (i.e. trope bundle theories) as-
pire to analyze monadic inherence (objects having tropes), e.g., 
by means of parthood, co-location and/or existential depend-
encies.4 Therefore, being a property (or, being an object) is not 
left primitive.   
The trope theoretical analysis of monadic inherence can be 
regarded as a case of metaphysical reduction: in the analysis of 
inherence, a central feature of reality (objects having proper-
ties) is reduced to the holding of a fact about the basic entities 
of the category system (tropes). In the basic level, there are as-
sumed to be only tropes that form objects if the respective ag-
gregate of tropes fulfils certain conditions.5 Correspondingly, 
the object has a trope as its property if and only if it has the 
trope as a certain kind of part. We may take a trope theory that 
identifies objects with mereological sums of co-located tropes 
as a simple example. Assume that object i is a mereological 
sum of three mutually co-located tropes t1, t2 and t3, which are 
determinate quantities. Let t1 be a determinate –e charge, t2 a 
determinate mass, and t3 a determinate spin quantum number. 
Object i has trope t1 as its property (i.e., i has a –e charge) if and 
only if i has trope t1 as its part and t1 is co-located with i. Thus, 
in the trope theoretical analysis of inherence, the reduction is 
assumed to take place in the general level of ontological cate-
gories: the facts about objects and properties are assumed to be 
identified with the facts about tropes and the complex entities 
tropes form. 
In trope theories, the “traditional” object-property dichot-
omy is explained away. Neither of these two categories – ob-
jects (entities characterized by properties) or properties (entities 
                                                 
3 Modes are introduced by the different substance attribute theorists in a 
two category ontology of substances and modes (cf. Martin 1980; Heil 
2012), or in Neo-Aristotelian four-category (Lowe 2006, 2009, 2015) and six-
category (Ellis 2001) ontologies. 
4 For instance, classical trope theories (Williams 1953, Campbell 1990) ana-
lyze monadic inherence in terms of parthood and co-location: trope t is a 
property of object i if and only if t is a part of i and t is co-located with i. 
5 According to Williams (1953) and Campbell (1990), tropes are existentially 
independent entities and objects are mereological sums of co-located (com-
present, concurrent) tropes. Cf. Keinänen (2011, sec. 3) and Fisher (2018) for 
further discussion. 
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inhering in or characterizing objects) – retains its status as a 
basic category. Fundamentally, tropes are neither properties 
nor objects. Although tropes are conveniently identified (or 
picked out) as “properties of their bearers” (like e charge of a 
positron or redness of a rose), they are particular natures – en-
tities of a single fundamental category – which constitute all 
(or almost all) other entities. 
Nevertheless, the trope theoretical analysis of inherence re-
mains silent about relations or relational entities. Dealing with 
the question about the existence and ontological status of rela-
tions has turned out to be difficult for trope theorists. Most 
trope theorists have recently held either of the two main alter-
native views about relations, which, as I will argue, are both 
unsatisfactory. The first is the eliminativist view adopted by 
Keith Campbell (1990) and Peter Simons (2014, 2016), accord-
ing to which there are no relations or relational entities. Every-
thing that exists is constituted by monadic tropes. Tropes are 
connected by different kinds of internal relations, but internal 
relations are not relational entities additional to their relata.6 
Secondly, the advocates of the relata specific view - Anna-Sofia 
Maurin (2002, 2010, 2011), Jan-Willem Wieland and Arianna 
Betti (Wieland & Betti 2008; Betti 2015) - introduce relational 
tropes in addition to monadic tropes.7 The existence of rela-
tional trope r is assumed to entail that r relates (or, relationally 
inheres in) certain specific relata a and b. 
As I will argue in section 2, the relata specific view is unsat-
isfactory because it re-introduces the primitive dichotomy be-
tween characterizing (relations) and characterized entities 
(objects) at the level of relations. According to the relata-spe-
cific view, there are both primitively relating (relational tropes) 
and primitively related entities (objects). The relata-specific 
view leaves relational inherence as a primitive formal ontologi-
cal relation between relational tropes and their relata. Thus, a 
trope theorist adopting the relata specific view loses one of the 
                                                 
6 For different kinds of internal relations, cf. Keinänen, Keskinen & 
Hakkarainen (2017, sec.2). 
7 Officially, Wieland & Betti (2008) and Betti (2015) stay neutral between 
tropes and modes. Moreover, they allow for the possibility of relata specific 
relation universals. However, they work out their position by considering 
the relata specific entities as tropes. 
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main benefits of trope theories, which is the general analysis of 
inherence. In order to retain the initial attraction of trope theo-
ries, eliminativism might seem to be an appealing option. In 
section 3, I argue that eliminativism sets serious limitations to 
the ontological explanatory power of trope theories. In addi-
tion to spatio-temporal relations, the current scientific theories 
have introduced entities which are serious candidates for enti-
ties to be best categorized as relations or relation-like existents. 
Therefore, the main objective of section 4 is to present a new 
trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence. The aim is to 
offer a metaphysical reduction of relational inherence, that 
trope r relates two or more entities. In other words, I reduce 
the holding of relational inherence to the obtaining of certain 
other relations in the trope theoretical category system. The 
analysis generalizes the trope theoretical analysis of inherence 
provided by the Strong Nuclear theory (SNT) (Keinänen 2011; 
Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2010, 2014) to relation-like tropes, r-
tropes, for short. Section 5 deals with asymmetric and non-
symmetric relations, which are a prima facie difficult case for 
the analysis, by assuming that all fundamental relations are 
quantities. Finally, in section 6, I provide a completely new ac-
count of the location of r-tropes. 
 
2. The relata specific view 
Anna-Sofia Maurin (2002, 2010, 2011), Jan-Willem Wieland & 
Arianna Betti (2008) and Betti (2015) have recently made an im-
portant contribution to trope ontology by defending relational 
tropes.8 According to their view, relational tropes are primi-
tively relating and relata specific entities. Assume that trope r 
is a relata-specific relational trope of 1 m distance between two 
objects a and b. Although there are minor differences in the dif-
ferent formulations of the relata specific view, a relata specific 
relational trope r is assumed to fulfil the following three con-
ditions: 
                                                 
8 However, Betti (2015, 100ff.) considers her defense of the relata specific 
view conditional: if we must introduce relations at all, the relata specific 
view constitutes the best account of relations. 
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1. Necessarily, if relational trope r exists, its relata, a and b, also exist. 
To put this in formal ontological terms, trope r is multiply rig-
idly dependent (only) on its relata, a and b.9 
2. Necessarily, if trope r exists, r relates (i.e., relationally inheres in) 
some relata. 
3. Necessarily, if trope r exists, r relates (relationally inheres in) its 
specific relata, a and b. 
Thus, according to the relata specific view of relational tropes 
(henceforth, the relata specific view), necessarily, if trope r exists, 
objects a and b are in a 1 m distance from each other. In other 
words, the sole existence of a relational trope is considered to 
entail that certain relational fact obtains. 
The relata specific relational tropes are introduced in order 
to avoid the modal version of Bradley’s regress, in which the con-
dition that starts the regress is formulated in modal terms. As-
sume that relational trope of 1 m distance r and its relata a and 
b exist. The general worry in this version of Bradley’s regress 
is that, prima facie, the existence of an external relation and its 
relata does not entail that the relation relates its relata. The pos-
tulation of additional relations – such as the relation of instan-
tiation connecting the relation and its relata – would only 
transfer the problem to a higher level (Wieland & Betti 2008; 
Maurin 2010, 2011). Relational tropes seem to solve the regress 
problem because the existence of certain relational trope r al-
ready entails that the relation between specific objects holds. 
For instance, the existence of 1 m distance trope r entails that 
objects a and b are in 1 m distance from each other. Because the 
existence of a and b does not entail the existence of r, the dis-
tance relation is contingent and external to its relata, objects a 
and b (Wieland & Betti 2008, sec.3). 
Returning to what the relata specific view entails, condi-
tions 1-3 are not independent of each other. It is fairly easy to 
                                                 
9 Let “≤ “ be a relation of improper parthood between entities and “E!” the 
predicate of (singular) existence. “SRD (e,f)” = e is strongly rigidly depend-
ent on f. The multiple rigid dependence of t on f and g, ”MRD (t, (f, g)”, can 
be presented as follows: MRD (t, (f, g)) =  (E!t  (E!f  E!g  (f  t)  (g 
 t)  ¬(f  g)  ¬(g  f)))   ¬ ( E!f)  ¬ ( E!g)  ¬ (SRD(f, g))  ¬ (SRD (g, 
f)). 
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observe that if relational trope r fulfils condition 3, it also sat-
isfies the two first conditions. Trivially, if trope r relates certain 
specific relata, trope r relates some relata (3 entails 2). Moreo-
ver, the holding of a relation between specific relata entails that 
the relata exist. Therefore, assuming that r is a relata specific 
relational trope – that the existence of r is sufficient to its relat-
ing objects a and b – entails that r is also multiply rigidly de-
pendent on a and b (3 entails 1). However, the converse does 
not hold (1 does not entail 3): multiple rigid dependence of 
trope s on two entities a and b does not entail that s relates these 
two entities.10 
The last-mentioned point requires some discussion because 
there has been confusion about the role of multiple rigid de-
pendence in the metaphysical explanation of relata specificity. 
Multiple rigid dependence (MRD, for short) is a formal ontolog-
ical relation that connects mereologically disjoint contingent ex-
istents. MRD spells out how its relata can exist as the 
constituents of the world. However, the constraints MRD sets 
on its relata are minimal: necessarily, if entity s exists (some-
where, somewhen), then its dependees a and b also exist 
(somewhere, somewhen). In addition to holding between a re-
lational trope and its relata, MRD can hold between events and 
the specific objects involved in these events or between bor-
ders and the objects confined by these borders, for instance. In 
order to distinguish between different kinds of entities which 
are multiply rigidly dependent on some other entities (e.g., be-
tween borders and relational tropes), we are obliged to pro-
vide a more detailed description of their category features. 
According to the relata specific view, it is a primitive cate-
gory feature of relational tropes that they relationally inhere in 
(i.e., relate) certain specific relata. In other words, specific rela-
tional inherence is not analyzed further and it is supposed to be 
a primitive formal ontological relation connecting its relata.11 
                                                 
10 As MacBride (2011, 173) observes, “[n]ecessary coexistence of a relation 
and its terms is not enough to ensure that the relation holds between its 
terms”.  To be more exact, the holding of 1 does not guarantee that r is a 
relational trope and that 3 holds. 
11 The most explicit advocates of the relata specific view, Wieland & Betti 
(2008) do not directly characterize specific relational inherence (“relating 
specific entities”) as a formal ontological relation. However, they assume it 
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Specific relational inherence fixes the categorial nature of rela-
tional tropes as a specific kind of relational accident (e.g., in 
contradistinction to borders and events). This formal ontolog-
ical relation spells out what general kind of entities relational 
tropes are and how they can exist as constituents of the 
world.12 The primitive relational inherence is comparable to 
the formal relation of characterization (“monadic inherence”) 
between modes (particular properties) and objects E.J. Lowe 
(2006, 2009, 2015) introduces in his Four-Category Ontology 
(cf. Keinänen 2018, sec.3). Like characterization, specific rela-
tional inherence is considered to be an internal relation: neces-
sarily, if given entities occurring in specific relational 
inherence (a relational trope and its relata) exist, specific rela-
tional inherence holds between its relata. The advocates of the 
relata specific view claim to avoid Bradley’s relation regress by 
assuming that the existence of the entities connected by spe-
cific relational inherence is sufficient to the holding of specific 
relational inherence.13 
The relata specific view faces three serious difficulties. The 
first is that the relata specific view introduces particular rela-
tions (i.e. relational tropes) as a primitive ontological category. 
In other words, it introduces a distinction between primitively 
relating and primitively related entities. This distinction is par-
allel to the primitive distinction between modes and objects 
(particular attributes and substances).14 One of the central mo-
tivations of trope theory is to eliminate the substance attribute 
distinction by means of the analysis of inherence (cf. Campbell 
1990, secs. 1.1-1.6). If trope theorists must re-introduce a paral-
lel distinction in the case of relational tropes, this seriously re-
duces the attraction of trope theories. 
Moreover, there are two more specific problems, which are 
closely connected to the first. The first of these problems is a 
                                                 
to be a part of the nature of relational tropes (as entities belonging to a cer-
tain category) that they relate certain specific relata (ibid, sec. 3). 
12 Cf. Hakkarainen & Keinänen (2017) and Hakkarainen (2018) for more on 
formal ontological relations. 
13 By using our terminology (cf. Keinänen, Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2017, 
sec. 2), specific relational inherence is assumed to be a basic internal relation 
between its relata. 
14 Particular properties or modes are recently advocated, e.g., by Lowe 
(2006, 2009, 2015), Ellis (2001) and Heil (2012). 
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consequence of the fact that specific relational inherence en-
tails multiple rigid dependence, but the converse does not 
hold. One can ask: can we find an analysis for relational inher-
ence by means of multiple rigid dependence and some addi-
tional condition? Like the analysis of monadic inherence, such 
an analysis would reduce the number of the primitive formal 
ontological relations needed in trope theory. Moreover, one 
could bring much-needed clarity to the category system by an-
alyzing relational inherence by means of more transparent 
primitive notions (such as parthood and rigid dependence). 
Since the relata specific view leaves relational inherence as a 
primitive formal ontological relation, the opportunity for a fur-
ther trope theoretical clarification of the category system is lost 
in the case of relational inherence. 
The third problem concerns the spatial or spatio-temporal 
location of relational tropes. Most trope theorists are inclined 
to adopt the ontological view that all entities are spatio-tem-
poral particulars, which Peter Simons (2010, 207; 2016, 113) 
calls “naturalistic nominalism”. Thus, let us assume that also 
relational tropes have a spatio-temporal (or, at least a tem-
poral) location. Assume that r is a 1 m distance trope relating 
objects a and b. Trope r is determining the location of other en-
tities, but it is difficult to determine the location of r (cf. Simons 
2003, sec.2). The advocates of relational tropes have not pro-
vided any answer to this difficulty. This is unsatisfactory be-
cause relational inherence seems to entail restrictions to the 
location of relational tropes – for instance, that relational 
tropes are at least temporally co-located with their relata. Since 
we are unaware of the exact consequences of relational inher-
ence, this casts doubt on using relational inherence as a basic 
notion of an ontological category system. 
 
3. Eliminativism 
According to eliminativism (Campbell (1990; Simons 2014, 
2016), there are no relations – relational tropes or any other 
kind of relational entities. Thus, relations (or, relational tropes) 
are eliminated as a fundamental category.15 The world is con-
stituted by monadic tropes, which are particular natures. 
                                                 
15 Earlier, Simons (2003, 2010) postulated entities he called “relational 
tropes”. Nevertheless, Simons’ “relational tropes” are relational accidents, 
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Because of the serious problems of the relata specific view, 
the adoption of eliminativism with respect to relations might 
seem to be an attractive option for trope theorists.16 Neverthe-
less, I will argue in this section that eliminativism is, if not 
provably false, at least a very risky position for two main rea-
sons. The first is that eliminativism seriously restricts the avail-
able options in providing a trope theoretical account of 
space/space-time. Secondly, eliminativism seems to block nat-
ural ways to categorize many entities introduced in scientific 
theories as relations or relation-like beings. 
Considering first the metaphysics of space/space-time, spa-
tio-temporal relations are widely considered as external rela-
tions between objects. In other words, their holding is 
contingent relative to the existence of their relata. Since elimi-
nativists deny the existence of relations, they would be obliged 
to consider (contingent) spatio-temporal relations derived inter-
nal relations, internal relations that hold due to the holding of 
the internal relations between entities some of which are dis-
tinct from the relata of the original relation (Keinänen, 
Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2017, sec. 2). For instance, having the 
same mass as between objects a and b is a derived internal re-
lation, which holds because of a and b having equal (“exactly 
similar”) mass tropes as their certain kinds of parts. Similarly, 
the spatial distance between objects a and b might be contin-
gent relative to the existence of a and b if there are certain ad-
ditional, mutually internally related entities also internally 
related to both a and b. 
Most of the recent eliminativist views about relations have 
been committed to a substantivalist theory of space/space-time (a 
substantivalist view for short): the claim that space-time points, 
regions of space-time or space-time itself are primitive object-
like entities.17 The general idea of these eliminativist accounts 
                                                 
entities multiply rigidly dependent on two or more entities. He does not 
bestow them with any additional category features. Therefore, Simons’ ear-
lier account of relational tropes is seriously incomplete (cf. note 10). 
16  Certain advocates of primitive substances, such as Heil (2012, 2016) and 
Lowe (2016), have also proposed strategies to avoid the postulation of rela-
tions. 
17 Lowe’s (2016) otherwise interesting account is a case in point. Mulligan 
(1996) avoids commitment to (“thick”) spatio-temporal relations by assum-
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is that the spatio-temporally related entities stand in some in-
ternal relations (such as identity or monadic inherence) to (the 
parts of) the space-time structure. The contingency of spatio-
temporal relations is either explained by means of the contin-
gent existence of the space-time structure or simply denied. 
Since trope theories strive to eliminate objects (in the sense of 
bearers of properties or relations) as a primitive category, a 
trope theorist adopting a substantivalist view would be 
obliged to construct space/space-time by means of tropes. No 
clear idea of such construction has been presented so far. Sub-
stantivalist theories of space/space-time typically allow for the 
existence of empty space-time points. No substantivalist trope 
theorist has managed to show that empty space-time points 
can be constructed by means of tropes. 
Thus, an anti-substantivalist or a relationalist theory of 
space/space-time might seem to be a preferable view for the 
trope theorist.18 Peter Simons (2016) has proposed a construc-
tion of space-time by means of internal relations among the 
fundamental concrete entities. This view is better character-
ized as an anti-substantivalist than a relationalist account of 
space-time because it does not introduce any relations or other 
relational entities. Instead, Simons assumes that fundamental 
entities are occurrents (i.e., processes and events) having their 
spatio-temporal locations necessarily. All standard continu-
ants (or, endurants) are Fregean abstractions from occurrents.19 
Moreover, he assumes a causal theory of time. 
Simons’ general claim that all fundamental particulars are 
occurrents is contestable and his examples of the construction 
                                                 
ing space-time points, which have tropes as their individual accidents. Alt-
hough being a trope theorist, Campbell is also inclined to adopt a substan-
tivalist theory of space-time. In his Abstract Particulars (1990), Campbell 
rejects his earlier (Campbell 1981) identification of tropes with “formed vol-
umes”, i.e., parts or regions of space/space-time. In his final, scientifically 
inspired version of trope theory, Campbell takes space-time as a single sim-
ple entity, and all other entities are fields in the same space-time manifold 
(1990, 145ff.).  
18 All theories of space/space-time that deny the existence space/space-
time or its parts as a separate substance(s) are anti-substantivalist. 
19 Cf. Simons (2000, 2008) for a proposal to construct continuant objects as 
Fregean abstractions from occurrents.  
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of continuants from occurrents have remained schematic.20 
Even if all fundamental entities were occurrents, we would 
need additional reasons to support the claim that occurrents 
have their specific locations necessarily. It might be tempting 
to individuate processes and events by their spatio-temporal lo-
cation, but it is not clear whether such intuitions about indi-
viduation are applicable to a process ontology like the one 
suggested by Simons.21 It seems to be a safer alternative for a 
trope theorist to adopt a relationalist theory of 
space/spacetime, which takes (some of the) spatio-temporal 
relations as relational entities. One can reconcile this full-
blown relationalist theory of space/space-time with a more 
standard view that the same entities could have had different 
locations or relative positions. In other words, the spatial/spa-
tio-temporal relations between entities are contingent relative 
to the existence of their relata. 
Finally, the current science and the current quantum phys-
ics in particular provide trope theorists independent reasons 
to postulate relations or relation-like entities. The current 
quantum physics introduces entangled states of two- or multi-
particle systems, which are serious candidates for fundamen-
tal relations between particles (cf. Teller 1986; Karakostas 
2009). For instance, Paul Teller (1986, sec.4) has argued that en-
tangled spin-states of two superposed electrons are best con-
sidered as relations, which do not supervene on the spatio-
temporal arrangement and the monadic properties of these 
particles. In the context of trope theory, these entangled spin-
states would be good candidates for relational tropes (cf. 
Keinänen 2011, 434). Additionally, a trope theorist may need 
to introduce relational tropes to account for the “emergent” 
features of complex objects, that is, the features of complex ob-
jects which do not supervene on the properties of their proper 
parts.22 Finally, the present-day quantum physics introduces 
                                                 
20 For instance, Simons’ (2000) examples of constructed continuants are 
complex objects. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether we would need 
continuant objects not reducible to occurrents as proper parts of complex 
objects.  
21 Cf. MacBride (2016, ch.2) for a brief criticism of Simons’ eliminativism. 
22 One possible example of such emergent properties are masses of complex 
physical particles like helium atoms, which cannot be directly reduced to 
the masses of their proper parts. I have suggested elsewhere that such 
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virtual particles (such as photons and gluons) to account for 
interactions between micro-particles (electrons, quarks). It is 
an interesting, a hitherto unstudied option to consider such in-
teractions relational tropes. 
Even this limited set of examples shows that there is reason-
able work for relational tropes in an a posteriori orientated 
trope theory. Most importantly, relational tropes (or tropes 
which would function like relational tropes) would bestow 
trope theory with the required ontological explanatory power 
to respond to the challenge of the different, currently popular 
relational ontologies. Given the serious difficulties the relata-
specific relational tropes face, the trope theorist is advised to 
seek for a reductive analysis of relational inherence. 
 
4. The analysis of relational inherence 
The basic idea in the reductive analysis of relational inherence 
is to generalize the trope theoretical analysis of monadic inher-
ence to “relational tropes”. In the analysis of relational inher-
ence, the general goal is to provide a metaphysical reduction 
of relational inherence: to identify the facts about two or more 
entities being connected by a relation with the facts about the 
entities of the trope theoretical category system. Since rela-
tional inherence is explained away, also relational tropes (i.e. 
primitively relating entities) are eliminated from trope theory. 
However, certain tropes, which I call “r-tropes”, take the role of 
relational entities in the present account. The main difference 
between standard “property tropes” and r-tropes is their 
standing in slightly different kinds of formal ontological rela-
tions and being parts of different kinds of complex entities. 
Nevertheless, there is no such thing as a primitive category dis-
tinction between primitively characterizing entities (proper-
ties), on the one hand, and primitively relating entities 
(relations), on the other.23 
                                                 
emergent properties are best categorized as relational tropes, cf. Keinänen 
(2011, 447). 
23 The entities belonging to the same category bear the same formal onto-
logical relations to themselves and to certain other entities. These formal 
ontological relations are internal relations – necessarily, if certain entities 
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Hence, the reductive analysis will have two main goals: the 
first is to eliminate the primitive distinction between relational 
tropes and their relata, which threatens to set serious limita-
tions to the ontological explanatory power of trope theories. 
The second goal is to incorporate the relation-like entities, 
which are capable of serving the core functions set to relations 
in an a posteriori basis, into the trope theoretical framework. 
My goal will not be to deal with all conceivable cases of rela-
tions. In order for the reductive analysis of relational inherence 
to serve its purpose, it suffices to consider credible a posteriori 
examples of relational entities and submit their relational in-
herence to reductive analysis. 
Recall that the different trope bundle theories analyze mo-
nadic inherence in different ways. For the present purposes, it 
suffices to consider two trope theories. Campbell’s (1990) the-
ory takes objects as mereological sums of mutually co-located 
(“compresent”) tropes. Correspondingly, trope t inheres in ob-
ject i if and only if t is a part of i and t is co-located with i.24 
By contrast, in the trope theory SNT (Keinänen 2011; 
Keinänen & Hakkarainen 2010, 2014), tropes are assumed to be 
mutually existentially dependent beings and objects are con-
stituted as aggregates of tropes connected by the formal onto-
logical relations of rigid and generic dependence.25 Here, I 
confine myself to outlining the features of the SNT directly rel-
evant to the present discussion.26 According to the SNT, every 
object has either a single nuclear trope or, alternatively, two or 
more tropes rigidly dependent on each other, the nuclear 
                                                 
exist, it is a primitive fact about them that certain formal ontological rela-
tions hold, cf. Hakkarainen (2018) for this kind of account of ontological 
categories. 
24 Since Campbell (1990, secs.4.3-4.4) constructs complex quantity tropes as 
“conjunctive compresences” of simpler tropes falling under the same de-
terminable, an additional maximality condition would be needed to be 
added to the analysis in order to deal with such mutually co-located tropes 
forming a complex trope. 
25 Let “≤ “ be a relation of improper parthood and  “E!” the predicate of 
(singular) existence. Entity e is strongly rigidly dependent on entity f, if the 
following condition holds: ¬(□ E!f) & □ ((E!e → E!f) & ¬( f ≤ e )), cf. Simons 
(1987, 112, 294ff.). 
26 Cf. Keinänen (2011, sec. 4) for a more systematic presentation of the SNT. 
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tropes.27 Nuclear tropes are necessary parts of an object i and, 
intuitively, constitute its “necessary properties”. Trope t is a 
part of object i if and only if t is rigidly dependent only on the 
nuclear tropes of i. Object i is a dependence closure of tropes with 
respect to rigid dependence.28 Because object i is a dependence 
closure of tropes, i is not rigidly dependent on any entity which 
not its proper part.29 
Unlike Campbell’s trope theory, the SNT does not build ob-
jects by means of co-location (“compresence”) but uses the re-
lations of existential dependence.30 The second major 
difference between these two trope theories concerns the de-
termination of the location of individual tropes. In Campbell’s 
trope theory, individual tropes are relata of the basic spatio-
temporal relations, whereas in the SNT, this function is given 
to certain trope bundles. According to the SNT, the certain 
kinds of aggregates of tropes (e.g. the nuclear tropes of a sub-
stance) form individuals, which are minimal relata of the basic 
spatio-temporal relations. The spatio-temporal locations of 
these complex entities determine the locations of their constit-
uent tropes. In a simple case, object i is constituted solely by its 
nuclear tropes and the location of i determines the location of 
the tropes that are its proper parts. The SNT analyzes monadic 
inherence in this special case as follows: trope t is a property of 
                                                 
27 According to the SNT, trope t is a nuclear trope if and only if 1) t is not 
rigidly dependent on any other trope (a single nuclear trope), or 2) t is rig-
idly dependent on certain trope(s) which are also rigidly dependent on t 
(two or more nuclear tropes). 
28 A dependence closure of tropes with respect to rigid dependence is a plu-
rality of tropes in which all rigid dependencies of the tropes in the plurality 
are fulfilled. Moreover, we assume that necessarily, if these tropes exist, 
they form an individual.  As a consequence, that individual is not rigidly 
dependent on any mereologically disjoint entity, cf. Keinänen (2011, 446-
447). 
29 The applicability of the notion of rigid dependence is restricted to contin-
gent existents cf. note 25. Moreover, as advocates of naturalistic nominal-
ism (cf. section 3), trope theorists can reject the existence of sets, on which 
objects would (allegedly) be rigidly dependent. 
30 Here, I offer only a simplified sketch of the construction of objects in the 
SNT. 
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object i if and only if, necessarily, if t exists, t is a proper part 
of i and t is co-located with i 31 
In what follows, my strategy is to generalize the analysis of 
monadic inherence of the trope theory SNT to r-tropes. Moreo-
ver, the analysis will adopt one of the main assumptions of the 
relata specific answer, namely, that r-tropes are multiply rig-
idly dependent (MRD, for short) on two or more entities. Since 
multiple rigid dependence is not sufficient to relational inher-
ence, we need to specify additional conditions that hold of 
trope r and objects a and b if r relationally inheres in a and b. 
Rigid dependence will be supplemented by the condition of 
necessary co-location as we will see below. Although the anal-
ysis of relational inherence is based on the idea that r-tropes 
are dependent existents, it is purported to be consistent with 
considering tropes other than r-tropes existentially independ-
ent as Williams (1953) and Campbell (1990) do. 
Thus, r-tropes are multiply rigidly dependent (MRD) on two 
or more entities. Assume, for instance, that r-trope r is a 1 m 
distance trope connecting entities a and b: a and b are in a 1 m 
distance from each other. Trope r is MRD on a and b. This mul-
tiple rigid dependence involves three things. First, necessarily, 
if distance trope r exists, entities a and b (its “relata”) also exist. 
Second, entities a and b are mereologically disjoint and mereo-
logically disjoint from r. In other words, r-tropes connect mu-
tually “wholly distinct” (mereologically disjoint) entities and 
are wholly distinct from the entities which they connect, their 
“relata”. Third, entities a and b are not rigidly dependent on 
each other. The third condition rules out the cases in which 
trope r is rigidly dependent on the nuclear tropes of a single 
object. Finally, in order to rule out trivial cases (e.g., in which 
the dependees a or b are necessary existents), it is presupposed 
in the characterization of MRD that trope r and entities a and b 
are all contingent existents.32 
                                                 
31 Keinänen (2011, 438-440). The more general condition, which also deals 
with the tropes contingent to an object, is temporally qualified: necessarily, 
trope t is co-located with i when it exists (ibid. 440ff.). 
32 The characterization of rigid dependence and multiple rigid dependence 
are thus restricted to contingent existents, cf. Simons (1987, 294ff.) for a sim-
ilar restriction. 
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The crucial step in the analysis is to add three more condi-
tions in order to obtain the conclusion that trope r relates, that 
is, relationally inheres in a and b. The first two conditions con-
cern the constitution of an r-complex. The first is that a and b 
are the only entities on which trope r is rigidly dependent, r is 
rigidly dependent only on a and b. Secondly, trope r together 
with its dependees (“relata”), a and b, form an individual, 
which I call an “r-complex rab”.33 R-complex rab is a depend-
ence closure of its proper parts with respect to rigid depend-
ence. As a dependence closure of its parts, r-complex rab is 
itself a strongly rigidly independent entity, it is not rigidly de-
pendent on any entity that is mereologically disjoint from rab. 
Hence, r-complexes are substances in the weak sense of being 
strongly independent particulars and individuals. 
The third condition is that r-complex rab is a spatio-tempo-
rally located entity: r-complex rab has a spatio-temporal loca-
tion and its location determines the location of its constituent 
r-trope, 1 m distance trope r. Like the objects constituted by 
their nuclear tropes, an r-complex is a strongly independent 
particular and has all of its proper parts necessarily. Moreover, 
as in the case of objects having only nuclear tropes, the location 
of the r-complex determines the location of its existentially de-
pendent part, r-trope r. As we will see below, some, but not all, 
r-complexes are entities that figure in the basic spatio-temporal 
relations and have an independent location in this sense. 
Again, they are like objects constituted by nuclear tropes. On 
the basis of these assumptions, I now propose the following 
analysis of the holding of relational inherence: 
 
[RI]: 
Trope r relationally inheres in a and b if and only if: 
1. r is multiply rigidly dependent (MRD) on a and b, but not 
rigidly dependent on any entity that is not a part of a or a 
part of b. 
2. a and b are not rigidly dependent on r. 
3. a is not rigidly dependent on b, and b is not rigidly depend-
ent on a. 
4. r, a and b constitute an individual, r-complex rab. 
                                                 
33 Note that every r-complex is an individual and a mereological sum of its 
parts (e.g., r + a + b = s). 
A Trope Theoretical Analysis of Relational Inherence   17 
 
5. Necessarily, if r exists, r is exactly co-located with rab. 
 
Let us take again 1 m distance trope r as an example. Trope r 
relates (relationally inheres in) a and b, if r is both multiply rig-
idly dependent on a and b and necessarily (exactly) co-located 
with r-complex rab, which is a mereological sum of all these 
three entities (i.e., r+a+b).34 
The purpose of [RI] is to generalize the analysis of monadic 
inherence of the trope theory SNT to r-tropes, that is, the tropes 
that fulfil clauses 1-3 of [RI]. This generalization is achieved by 
assuming that the corresponding r-complex, whose existence 
is entailed by the existence of r, is an individual having a spe-
cific spatio-temporal location. Moreover, like the location of an 
individual constituted by mutually rigidly dependent tropes 
(nuclear tropes), the location of the r-complex determines the 
location of its existentially dependent parts (an r-trope in this 
special case). Thus, necessarily, if r-trope r exists, it is co-lo-
cated with rab. As a consequence, trope r fulfills the conditions 
of monadic inherence in relation to complex rab: necessarily, if 
r exists, r is a (proper) part of rab and r is co-located with rab. 
Thus, r is a monadic property of complex rab. According to 
[RI], by being a monadic property of r-complex rab, trope r also 
relationally inheres in a and b. 
In order to motivate this analysis of relational inherence, it 
is useful to begin with the idea of tropes as particular natures 
(-e charges, 1 m lengths, etc.). According to the analyses of mo-
nadic inherence discussed above, tropes are monadic proper-
ties of an individual because they are mutually co-located 
parts of that individual, which might also need to fulfil some 
additional conditions (as in the SNT). R-tropes, like 1 m dis-
tance trope r, are particular natures co-located with the corre-
sponding r-complexes and monadic properties of these r-
complexes. Furthermore, r-trope r is a certain kind of entity 
that connects mutually distinct entities, a and b, into a certain 
kind of more inclusive whole. In order to see this, we need to 
observe three things. First, trope r and complex rab are 
(weakly) rigidly dependent on a and b. Thus, second, given 
                                                 
34 In what follows, I leave out the qualification, although I refer to exact co-
location when talking about “co-location”. 
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that trope r exists, a and b are parts of a certain kind of r-com-
plex, rab. Third, since a and b are proper parts of complex rab, 
their locations are parts of the location of rab.35 Consequently, 
locations of a and b are parts of the location of trope r. 
Hence, according to [RI], tropes relate (relationally inhere 
in) their relata by being properties of the respective r-com-
plexes (“relational complexes”), which have their relata as 
proper parts. In the special case discussed just above, trope r 
(1 m distance trope r) relates entities a and b in a certain way 
because r “makes” a and b as parts of a certain kind of complex 
individual, 1 m distance r-complex rab. 
 
5. Asymmetric and non-symmetric relations 
An obvious worry with [RI] concerns asymmetric and non-sym-
metric relations. Causal relations, relations of spatial direction 
(such as being to the left of) and temporal direction (being after 
than) are salient examples of asymmetric relations. Many rela-
tions between quantitative properties (such as being greater 
than or equal to), some spatial relations (facing) and relations 
manifesting human attitudes (admiring, loving) are non-sym-
metric without being asymmetric. Prima facie, asymmetric and 
non-symmetric relations hold between entities in a certain or-
der (cf. Fine 2000, 1).  For instance, Muodoslompolo is to north 
of Tornio but Tornio is not to north of Muodoslompolo (asym-
metry); Young Werther loves Charlotte, but Charlotte does not 
love Werther (non-symmetry). It seems that [RI] is not able to 
deal with non-symmetric or asymmetric relations because r-
tropes do not themselves bestow any order on the parts of r-
complexes. Therefore, it seems that clause [RI] can only pro-
vide us with an account of the special cases of relational inher-
ence in which the relation under consideration is symmetric 
(e.g., the relational tropes of spatial distance if there are such 
entities). As a consequence, if we accept the proposed analysis, 
we seem to be obliged to deny the existence of all asymmetric 
and non-symmetric relations. This is an untenable conclusion 
if we take seriously the examples of relations the empirical sci-
ence gives us (cf. MacBride 2014, sec.1, 2016, sec. 4). 
                                                 
35 As Parsons (2007, 213) argues, all concrete entities satisfy the following 
principle of Expansivity: the spatial location of a whole is as least as inclu-
sive as the spatial location of its proper parts. 
A Trope Theoretical Analysis of Relational Inherence   19 
 
Nevertheless, some of the above examples are basic or de-
rived internal relations, which do not exist as separate relational 
entities. Rather, tropes and complex entities they constitute are 
internally related in different ways.36 In section 3, I already 
mentioned derived internal relations. Having a greater mass 
than or having a smaller charge than are examples of asym-
metric derived internal relations, which hold between objects 
having certain kinds of mass or charge tropes as their parts. 
Moreover, the quantity tropes falling under a determinable 
(e.g. electric charge) are mutually connected by the different 
basic internal relations of proportion (e.g., 1:1 proportion or -
3:1 proportion) and the basic internal relation of order (greater 
than or equal to). These basic internal relations hold because 
tropes are certain thin particular natures - the existence of the 
related entities is a sufficient condition for their obtaining. 
Moreover, the holding of these relations does not depend, even 
indirectly, on the existence of any specific entities distinct from 
their original relata (Keinänen; Keskinen & Hakkarainen 2017, 
sec.3). Here, the relation of order is non-symmetric, whereas 
the relations of proportion are symmetric or asymmetric. 
Formal ontological relations constitute additional examples 
of basic or derived internal relations.37 For instance, tropes are 
proper parts of objects, which is an asymmetric formal onto-
logical relation. Moreover, in the SNT, all tropes constituting 
an object are connected by the non-symmetric formal ontolog-
ical relation of rigid dependence. Asymmetric and non-sym-
metric basic or derived internal relations do not cause any 
problem for the present analysis: because they are not rela-
tional entities, internal relations do not relationally inhere in 
anything. Rather, it is a primitive fact about quantity tropes 
that they are ordered, that e charge tropes are greater than e/3 
charge tropes, for instance. Similarly, it is a primitive fact about 
tropes that they are rigidly dependent on certain distinct 
tropes. 
                                                 
36 Cf. Keinänen; Keskinen & Hakkarainen (2017, sec.2) for a more precise 
characterization of the distinction between basic and derived internal rela-
tions. 
37 Cf. Hakkarainen & Keinänen (2017) for the distinction between formal 
ontological relations, which are “nature neutral”, and other basic internal 
relations. 
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Moreover, I adopt a sparse theory of relational entities, 
which is in line with a sparse theory of tropes (Campbell 1990, 
sec. 1.8): there are only few different kinds of relational entities, 
which are all discovered empirically. An advocate of a sparse 
theory of relational entities can remain skeptical of the exist-
ence of any such macro-level relational entities as the relational 
tropes of love or macroscopic causation (Simons 2003; Lowe 
2016, 106-110). The best prima facie candidates for r-tropes are 
basic (or, comparatively basic) physical quantities. Among 
them, there are asymmetric vector quantities like momentum 
and asymmetric quantitative spatial and temporal relations. 
Assuming that all r-tropes are quantities, we can present a 
general strategy to deal with their asymmetry. In this account, 
we need not assume that inherence of r-tropes is asymmetric. 
In order to take a simple example, consider distances in some 
direction in a one-dimensional space.38 Assuming that there 
are distance-direction tropes, they are vector quantities, mag-
nitudes with a certain direction. In predicate logic, the direc-
tion of an asymmetric relation is typically indicated by 
argument places. Thus, for instance, object a is 1 m to the left 
of object b, Lab. Sentence “Lba” can be used to indicate that b 
is 1 m to the left of a. Hence, a relational predicate applies to a 
pair of objects in different ways depending on the direction of 
the corresponding relation. 
It is important to keep in mind that r-tropes do not have any 
formal-ontologically specified direction. First, r-tropes do not 
have any argument places, by means of which the relata are 
put into some order. Second, the source of the order of the re-
lata cannot be the different ways in which an r-trope is multi-
ply rigidly dependent on certain entities. There is only one and 
a unique way in which an r-trope is multiply rigidly depend-
ent on certain entities. 
Nevertheless, the r-tropes of distance-direction are, as par-
ticular natures, determinate magnitude-directions (vectors). 
Like all quantity tropes falling under a determinable, the r-
tropes of distance-direction are mutually connected by the dif-
                                                 
38 Of course, space-time intervals have replaced distances as basic quanti-
ties in the current physical theories of space-time. Therefore, I present this 
example of distance direction tropes only as an illustration. 
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ferent basic internal relations of positive or negative propor-
tion (like, say 1:1 proportion or -3:1 proportion) and the basic 
internal relation of order (greater than or equal to). The choice 
of the unit for distance-direction is a matter of convention as 
well as which of these r-tropes of distance-direction get posi-
tive and which negative values. By contrast, because of being 
determined by the distance-direction tropes, the relations of 
proportion and order between distance-direction tropes re-
main invariant in all choices of the unit.39 
Whether two r-tropes of distance-direction are connected by 
a relation of positive or negative proportion spells out their rel-
ative directions. The r-tropes connected by some relation of 
negative proportion are distance-directions to opposite direc-
tions, whereas the distance-direction r-tropes to the same di-
rection are connected by some relation of positive proportion. 
Thus, according to the present approach, the direction is al-
ready included in a distance-direction trope as a particular na-
ture. Similarly, an r-complex having a distance-direction trope 
as a proper part has an intrinsic direction determined by the 
respective r-trope, which may be opposite to the direction of 
another r-complex. 
Hence, the present approach denies that r-tropes have any 
formal-ontologically determined (absolute or relative) direc-
tion. Unlike the recent views in the metaphysics of relations 
(e.g., positionalism or anti-positionalism), the present ap-
proach does not introduce any general (logical or formal-onto-
logical) devices to determine the relative direction of argument 
places (cf. Fine 2000, secs. 3-4; MacBride 2014). Instead, the di-
rection of a relational fact is determined by an r-trope as a par-
ticular nature.40 The present approach does not over-generate 
directionality because the non-directional r-tropes falling un-
                                                 
39 Cf. Keinänen; Keskinen & Hakkarainen (2017, sec.3) for a defense of the 
same general account of internal relations between quantity tropes falling 
under a determinable. 
40 Certain r-tropes have an absolute direction as vectors. However, the di-
rection of an r-trope is based on its nature and it does not correspond to 
any fixed order of the relata figuring as arguments of a relation. Similarly, 
there is no fixed way to indicate this direction by means of the order of the 
argument places of a two-place predicate, for instance. 
22   Markku Keinänen 
 
der a determinable (e.g., distance tropes if there are such enti-
ties) are related only by the relation of order and the relations 
of positive proportion. 
The above kind of quantitative r-tropes are good prima facie 
candidates for truthmakers of asymmetric predications such as 
“a is 1 m to the left of b” or “b is 1 m to the right of a”. Accord-
ing to the present conception, these two sentences have the 
same truthmaker (i.e., some r-complex rab), but they corre-
spond to the different ways in which the positive/negative 
unit of distance-direction can be selected. 
Nevertheless, the best current candidates for the basic spa-
tio-temporal r-tropes are particular space-time intervals. They 
are mutually connected by the different relations of positive, 
negative or zero proportion. However, space-time intervals do 
not have any intrinsic direction. Rather, the different kinds of 
intervals between objects in space-time points indicate, for in-
stance, whether or not these space-time points can be involved 
in one temporally continuous succession of events. Thus, we 
are entitled to expect that asymmetric predications like “a is 
before b” or “a causes b” do not have r-tropes as their sole 
truthmakers, but, rather, more complicated structures of enti-
ties, which may involve some r-tropes.41 
  
6. The location of r-tropes  
According to clause [RI], an r-complex is an individual pos-
sessing certain spatial or spatio-temporal location, which de-
termines the location of the corresponding r-trope. An 
advocate of the present analysis of relational inherence is 
obliged to provide some account of the determination of the 
location of r-complexes. Providing an answer to this question 
is particularly important in the case of r-complexes partially 
constituted by spatial or spatio-temporal r-tropes. There is a 
threat of a regress of spatial or spatio-temporal r-tropes if we 
need to postulate additional r-tropes to account for the location 
of every such r-complex. 
The second issue concerns the peculiar character of spatial 
r-tropes. As we saw above, spatial r-tropes are assumed to be 
                                                 
41 For instance, the claims about temporal precedence of events might be 
made true by complicated physical facts involving the increase of total en-
tropy in universe. 
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distances or distance-directions between the different occu-
pants of space. We need no recourse to relational inherence in 
the formal-ontological characterization of the r-complexes par-
tially constituted by the spatial r-tropes. Nevertheless, since 
spatial r-tropes are assumed to be distances between objects, 
one might claim that being a relation is smuggled into the 
(non-formal) nature of r-tropes.42 In what follows, I deal with 
these two issues concerning the spatial or spatio-temporal r-
tropes and the respective r-complexes first. Finally, I address 
the determination of the location of r-complexes constituted by 
means of other kinds of r-tropes. 
The current metaphysical discussion of space-time is, in 
large part, still dominated by the rivalry between substantival-
ist and relationalist theories about space-time.43 According to 
the contemporary substantivalists, space-time is an inde-
pendently existing entity of its own, which is constituted by 
space-time points having certain inertial features like curva-
ture (Teller 1991, 363-4, 379). Relationalism (or, “liberalized re-
lationalism” as Teller calls it) introduces spatio-temporal 
relations between actual objects and actual and possible ob-
jects. One is supposed to obtain the empty space-time points 
as locations of possible objects. Moreover, one is supposed to 
be able to construct the whole space-time manifold (the system 
of space-time points) by means of spatio-temporal relations 
(ibid). 
From the point of view of trope theory, both of substantival-
ism and relationalism about space-time are problematic views. 
In section 3, I already mentioned the difficulty of constructing 
empty space-time points by means of tropes. A related prob-
lem can be addressed to liberalized relationalism: it is reason-
able to demand that relations can connect only entities that 
exist. Thus, relationalism is prima facie committed to the exist-
ence of possible but non-actual objects. The merely possible 
objects are needed as relata of spatio-temporal relations. It is 
difficult to present any account of the construction of merely 
possible objects from tropes, which are actual and spatio-tem-
poral entities. As a consequence, liberalized relationalism 
seems to be an equally unacceptable conception of space-time 
                                                 
42 I am grateful to Jani Hakkarainen for presenting this problem. 
43 For additional alternative accounts of space-time, cf. e.g., Pooley (2005). 
24   Markku Keinänen 
 
for a trope theorist as substantivalism, with which it is sup-
posed to compete. 
Without solving the problem of empty space-time points 
here, I adopt a broadly relationalist conception of space-time. 
According to it, r-tropes, which correspond to spatio-temporal 
relations, and the respective r-complexes constitute space-time 
(space might be used in illustrations). In other words, space-
time is not considered as a separate object. Rather, space-time 
is a structure (wholly or partially) constituted by the mutually 
connected r-complexes. Although there are open issues in this 
type of view (like the status of empty space-time points if there 
are such items), it seems to provide us with a promising start-
ing point for the construction of space-time from tropes. 
For purposes of illustration, let us consider space and spa-
tial relations between objects (distances or distance-direc-
tions). Consider now a single r-complex rab, which is a part of 
space, that is, the r-complex which has trope r (certain particu-
lar distance or distance-direction), and objects a and b as its 
parts. We can identify r-trope r with the shortest path of space 
connecting a and b. Trope r is a particular nature, a certain 
length in space. By being rigidly dependent on a and b and co-
located with the respective r-complex, trope r can exist only in 
presence of the contents of space (space-time). 
The location of r-complex rab is determined holistically, by 
its place in the system of spatial r-complexes. Assume that all 
other r-complexes than rab exist, among them the r-complexes 
that overlap rab by having a or b as their parts. If these other r-
complexes exist, there must also be an r-complex connecting a 
and b. In other words, there must be an r-complex which has 
the same position in the network of r-complexes as rab. If rab 
exists, it has this specific position. Thus, the system of r-com-
plexes determines the location of rab as a part of space. 
It is possible to make additional assumptions, which con-
strain the nature of r-complex rab or any other r-complex hav-
ing the same place in the system of r-complexes. In a special 
case of Euclidean space, the other existing r-complexes are 
parts of space and the spatial relations between a and other ob-
jects, and b and other objects are sufficient to necessitate the 
fact that a and b are connected by a r-trope (particular distance 
or distance-direction) of a certain determinate kind. However, 
the structure of space may have local variation, which allows 
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for a and b to be connected by different kinds of r-tropes. The 
identification of relational tropes with paths of space (space-
time) solves the location problem of spatial (spatio-temporal) 
r-tropes: they are concrete entities that contribute to constitut-
ing space (space-time). 
The second problem concerns the alleged primitive related-
ness included in the nature of a spatial r-trope. In response, one 
can avoid primitive relatedness in the following way: objects a 
and b are parts of r-complex rab. Because of being proper parts 
of the distinct r-complexes, the locations of these objects, a and 
b, are proper parts of the locations of the distinct r-complexes. 
The r-complexes, which have an object as a proper part, assign 
to the object a determinate location as an intersection of the lo-
cations of these r-complexes. Therefore, we need not assume 
that an r-complex determines a primitive between-ness rela-
tion connecting objects a and b; rather, the system of r-com-
plexes determines that objects a and b are in a certain distance 
(distance-direction) from each other.44 
In the end of section 3, I provided some prima facie exam-
ples of relational entities such as entangled spin-states of 
multi-particle systems, emergent properties of complex objects 
and virtual particles. They are both good candidates for r-
tropes and spatially located entities. It seems that the respec-
tive r-complexes are independently located entities and that 
their locations can be determined by spatial/spatio-temporal 
r-tropes. Of course, the specific details of such an account must 
be worked out in distinct cases. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Because of the reductive analysis of monadic inherence (ob-
jects having tropes), trope theories have promised to analyze 
away the primitive dichotomy between characterizing (prop-
erties) and characterized entities (objects). As I argued in sec-
tion 2, the best trope theoretical account of relations, the relata 
specific view, re-introduces the same dichotomy at the level of 
relations. This is unsatisfactory and it reduces the initial appeal 
of trope theories. Nevertheless, we need relation-like entities 
                                                 
44 One might claim that r-complexes self-locate (are their own locations). 
However, this not quite right because we need the whole system of r-com-
plexes for an r-complex to have a specific location. 
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in an adequate conception of the categorial structure of reality, 
which rules out eliminativism about relations (section 3). 
Therefore, in section 4, I presented a novel trope theoretical 
analysis of relational inherence, which is a generalization of 
the analysis of monadic inherence provided by the trope the-
ory SNT. The analysis provides us with a metaphysical reduc-
tion of relational inherence to the facts about the entities of the 
trope theoretical category system. The core feature of the anal-
ysis is to introduce multiply rigidly dependent tropes, which I 
call r-tropes. Like all tropes, r-tropes are particular natures with 
a specific location. If r-trope r is multiply rigidly dependent on 
objects a and b, entities r, a and b form a complex individual, r-
complex rab. An r-complex is a concrete particular and the lo-
cation of r-complex rab determines the location of r. R-trope r 
relationally inheres in entities a and b by unifying them into r-
complex rab and by being co-located with rab. For instance, 
since 1 m distance trope r unifies objects a and b into complex 
rab, objects a and b are in 1 m distance from each other. 
In section 5, I argued that the present analysis can deal with 
asymmetric and non-symmetric relations by assuming that all 
fundamental relations are quantities. Finally, section 6 delivers 
an account of the determination of the location of r-tropes also 
in the difficult case in which an r-trope contributes to deter-
mining the spatial or spatio-temporal location of objects.45  
 
University of Tampere  
 
References 
Allen, S. (2016), A Critical Introduction to Properties, London, Bloomsbury. 
Armstrong, D.M. (1989), Universals – an Opinionated Introduction, Boulder, 
Westview Press. 
Betti, A. (2015), Against Facts, Cambridge Ma., MIT Press. 
Campbell, K. K. (1981), “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars”, Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy 6, 477-488. 
                                                 
45 I wish to thank A.R.J. Fisher, Robert Garcia, Daniel Giberman, Jani 
Hakkarainen, Antti Keskinen, Anna-Sofia Maurin, Tommi Vehkavaara and 
two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on the earlier drafts of this 
article. Moreover, I thank the participants of the Nordic Network of Meta-
physics conference “Metaphysics of Properties”. Finally, I thank Finnish 
Cultural Foundation for funding this research. 
A Trope Theoretical Analysis of Relational Inherence   27 
 
Campbell, K. K. (1990), Abstract Particulars, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. 
Ellis, B. D. (2001), Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Fine, K. (2000), “Neutral Relations”, The Philosophical Review 109(1), 1-33. 
Fisher, A. R. J. (2018), “Instantiation in Trope Theory”, American Philosoph-
ical Quarterly 55(2), 153-164. 
Giberman, D. (2014), “Tropes in Space”, Philosophical Studies 167(2), 453-
472.  
Hakkarainen, J. (2018), “Ontological Form and Moderate Categorial Real-
ism”, manuscript. 
Hakkarainen, J. & Keinänen. M. (2017), “The Ontological Form of Tropes – 
Refuting Douglas Ehring’s Main Argument Against Standard Trope 
Nominalism”, Philosophia 45(2), 647-658. 
Heil, J. (2012), The Universe As We Find It, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Heil J (2016), “Causal Relations”, in A. Marmodoro & D. Yates (eds.), The 
Metaphysics of Relations, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 127-137. 
Karakostas, V. (2009), “Humean Supervenience in the Light of Contempo-
rary Science”, Metaphysica 10(1), 1-26. 
Keinänen, M. (2011), “Tropes – the Basic Constituents of Powerful Particu-
lars?”, Dialectica 65(3), 419-450. 
Keinänen, M. (2018), “Instantiation and Characterization: Problems in 
Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology”, in Timothy Tambassi (ed.), Studies in 
the Ontology of E.J. Lowe, Neunkirchen-Seelscheid, Editiones Scholasti-
cae, pp. 109-124. 
Keinänen, M. & Hakkarainen, J. (2010), “Persistence of Simple Substances”, 
Metaphysica 11(2), 119-135. 
Keinänen, M. & Hakkarainen, J. (2014), “The Problem of Trope Individua-
tion – A Reply to Lowe”, Erkenntnis 79(1), 65-79. 
Keinänen, M., Keskinen, A. & Hakkarainen, J. (2017), “Quantity Tropes and 
Internal Relations”, Erkenntnis, published online. 
Lowe, E. J. (2006), The Four-Category Ontology, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Lowe, E. J. (2009), More Kinds of Being, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell. 
Lowe, E. J.  (2015), “In Defence of Substantial Universals”, in G. Galluzzo 
& M. J. Loux (eds.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 65-84. 
Lowe, E. J. (2016), “There are probably no relations”, in A. Marmodoro & 
D. Yates (eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 100-112. 
MacBride, F.  (2011), “Relations and Truth-Making”, Proceedings of the Aris-
totelian Society 111, 159–76. 
28   Markku Keinänen 
 
MacBride, F. (2014), “How Involved You Want To Be In A Non-Symmetric 
Relationship”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92, 1-16. 
MacBride, F. (2016), "Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stan-
ford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/relations/>. 
Martin, C. B. (1980), “Substance Substantiated”, Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy 58(1), 3-10.  
Maurin, A-S. (2002),  If Tropes, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Maurin, A-S. (2010), “Trope Theory and the Bradley’s Regress”, Synthese 
175(3), 311-326. 
Maurin, A-S. (2011), “An Argument for the Existence of Tropes”, Erkenntnis 
74(1), 69-79. 
Mulligan, K. (1998), “Relations Through Thick and Thin”, Erkenntnis 48 (2 
& 3), 325-353. 
Parsons, J. (2007), “Theories of Location”, in D. W. Zimmerman (ed.), Ox-
ford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 3, pp. 201–232. 
Pooley, O. (2005), “Points, particles, and structural realism”, in Rickles, D., 
French, S. & Saatsi, J. (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Grav-
ity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 83-120. 
Simons, P. M. (1987),  Parts – a Study in Ontology, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Simons, P. M. (2000), “Continuants and Occurrents”, Proceedings of the Ar-
istotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 74, 59-75. 
Simons, P. M. (2003), “Tropes, Relational”, Conceptus 35, 53-73. 
Simons, P. M. (2008), “The Thread of Persistence”, in Kanzian, C. (ed.), Per-
sistence, Frankfurt, Ontos Verlag, pp. 165-184. 
Simons, P. M. (2010), “Relations and Truth-Making”, Proceedings of the Ar-
istotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 84, 199-213. 
Simons, P. M. (2014), “Relations and Idealism: On Some Arguments of 
Hochberg against Trope Nominalism”, Dialectica, 68, 305–315. 
Simons, P. M. (2016), “External Relations, Causal Coincidence, and Contin-
gency”, in A. Marmodoro & D. Yates (eds.), The Metaphysics of Relations, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 113-126. 
Teller, P. (1986), “Relational Holism and Quantum Mechanics”, British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science 43, 201-218. 
Teller, P. (1991), “Substance, Relations, and Arguments about the Nature of 
Space-Time”, Philosophical Review 100(3), 363-397. 
Wieland, J. W. & Betti, A. (2008), “Relata-specific Relations: A Response to 
Vallicella”, Dialectica 62(4), 509-524. 
Williams, D. C. (1953), “On the Elements of Being I”, Review of Metaphysics 
7, 3-18. 
 
